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Yoshio Suzuki, Ed. The Japanese Financial System (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1987), pp. xi, 358. 
This is the definitive description of the Japanese banking 
system and more generally the Japanese financial system, prepared 
by the Director and staff of the Institute for Monetary and 
Economic Studies of the Bank of Japan, the central bank. It is 
essential both as an introduction and reference work to 
understand Japan's complex range of financial institutions, and 
now burgeoning variety of financial instruments and financial 
markets. 
But this book is more that. It provides in the two rather 
brief chapters of Part I a succinct, analytical overview of the 
nature and causes of Japan's process of financial deregulation 
and liberalization from the early 1970's to the mid-1980's. And, 
following the three detailed chapters on the nuts and bolts of 
the financial system, the book concludes with an interesting, 
analytical though cautious introduction to the objectives, 
instruments, and avowed success of the monetary policy of the 
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Bank of Japan. The analytical touch of the editor, Dr. Yoshio 
Suzuki, a distinguished scholar of Japanese finance, is clearly 
in evidence. 
The past always shapes the present, and that is especially 
true for Japan's financial system today. The analytical and the 
institutional starting point of this book is the postwar period 
prior to the early 1970's, when Japan's financial system was 
highly regulated and insulated from foreign financial markets and 
institutions. Interest rates on deposits, loans and bond issues 
were fixed; only a narrow range of financial instruments were 
allowed; the types and numbers of financial institutions were 
fixed and new entry of institutions, though not of branch 
offices, virtually prohibited; and financial markets were highly 
segmented, with each type of financial institution expected to 
stay in its own area of expertise. The city banks and the long-
term credit banks were at the top of the heap. Government debt 
was negligible, the bond market virtually non-existent, and the 
stock market only a minor source of corporate funds. 
To finance their very rapid growth, businesses borrowed from 
banks in huge amounts (termed "indirect finance"). Excess funds 
in local financial institutions were transferred to city banks 
through interbank call loans; the Bank of Japan provided the 
necessary expansion of credit to support non-inflationary growth 
by loans to city banks (there were no government securities to 
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use for open market operations). Markets were important, but 
segmented, and credit rationing was used in combination with 
interest rates (prices) to allocate the funds corporations 
eagerly sought. It was a cozy, tightly controlled, highly 
effective system that benefited borrowers over savers, business 
over consumers, big business over small. There were, of course, 
various ways to ameliorate the obvious rigidities and non-market 
clearing features of the system, such as required compensating 
deposit balances on loans to increase effective interest rates 
and tax exemption of interest of small deposits (the maruyu 
system abolished April 1, 1988). Nonetheless, by and large, the 
system worked quite well in the era of extremely rapid economic 
growth between 1955 and 1973; given the well established 
financial structure, the burgeoning demand for investment funds, 
and the equally rapid growth in savings channelled through the 
financial system such success is not surprising. 
The central theme of this book is how, to what degree, and 
why this previously highly regulated system has broken down, 
where it is now, and where it is likely to go. The basic story 
is one of gradual but accumulatively massive liberalization, 
deregulation, and integration among domestic financial markets, 
from an inflexible to a free market-determined system for pricing 
and allocating funds. While the process has been incremental, 
for many, frustratingly slow, and still not completed — there 
was no "big bang" as in London recently nor a massive surge of 
4 
deregulation as in the United States at the beginning of the 
1980's — it has resulted in a major transformation of the rules, 
modes of operation, activities of financial institutions, 
expansion of types of financial assets and liabilities, and a 
virtual explosion of financial activities as measured by daily 
transactions and total amounts outstanding. 
The dominant position of big banks has been eroded by the 
sharp increases in new corporate bond and stock issues (direct 
finance), and by securities companies underwriting and trading 
them. They have been afflicted by disintermediation — the shift 
of bank deposits, especially the large ones, to other, better-
yielding financial assets. They have responded by expanding into 
new activities — loans to medium and small business, foreign 
lending, the underwriting of securities in Europe (still not 
allowed in Japan under Japan's Article 65 of the Securities Act 
based on the U.S. Glass - Steagall Act which separates commercial 
banking and underwriting activities). 
Financial institutions are invading each other's markets 
while fighting hard to maintain their own turf; market 
segmentation is breaking down. However, this transformation is 
not yet complete. Important restrictive regulations remain, such 
as interest ceilings financial institutions can pay on the 
smaller time deposits of ordinary persons or the new issue of 
government bonds through syndicate allocation rather than by 
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market auction. And the Ministry of Finance persists in refusing 
to issue sufficient amounts of short-term government bills 
(Treasury Bills or TB's) on competitive terms so that, unlike the 
United States and the United Kingdom, Japan lacks this financial 
market which provides the key short-term risk-free interest rate 
upon which all other money market rates are usually based. 
This book chronicles these fundamental, innovative changes 
from the early 1970's to 1985, the terminal date for most data in 
the volume. That is not a serious problem though; the basic 
trends continue, and data can readily be updated from current 
Bank of Japan publications. 
The chronicle takes two forms. From the viewpoint of a 
macroeconomist or a specialist on Japanese economy and finance, 
the two chapters of Part I (comprising only 61 pages) are a 
dream. They provide a clear, concise description and analysis, 
backed by excellent data in tables and text, which lay out the 
major financial trends of 1970-1985 in historical perspective, 
and carefully discuss the major forces making for deregulation 
since 1975. The non-specialist may find it somewhat heavy going, 
especially Chapter 1, since a great deal of substance is 
presented in fairly concentrated doses. But the material is well 
worth the effort - and is well presented in literary and tabular, 
not mathematical, form. 
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The macroeconomic changes in savings, investment, and hence 
flows of funds are traced for the personal, corporate business, 
government and foreign sectors. One key point is that while the 
share of private saving in GNP has decreased since 1975 that of 
private investment has declined even more. The financial system 
has been awash in surplus savings for more than a decade. Almost 
all financial institutions have had more funds than their 
traditional lending activities required. Between 1975-80 these 
surplus savings were absorbed by large and expanding government 
deficit spending financed by government bond issues, and from 
1981 to the present by large lending to the rest of the world 
(especially the United States) based on merchandise export and 
current account surpluses. 
As chapter 2 discusses, the now substantial government debt 
outstanding together with ongoing new issues, the rise of 
corporate and individual holders of large surplus funds, the 
opportunities for lending and borrowing abroad, and technological 
innovations in communications and payments systems, all created 
market pressures and powerful domestic (and foreign) interests 
which virtually forced deregulation upon the Ministry of Finance 
and the Bank of Japan. Probably the single most important factor 
was the government's need to sell huge amounts of bonds to 
finance its deficit spending, and the development of active 
trading of already-issued bonds in freely competitive markets. 
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While this liberalization process is generally beneficial it does 
increase risk for financial institutions individually and for the 
financial system as a whole, as is nicely if tersely treated (pp. 
50-57). 
Part II is the nuts and bolts primer, comprising some five-
sixths of the book. Its four chapters - on financial assets, 
financial markets and interest rates, financial institutions and 
the Bank of Japan and monetary policy - are descriptive, factual, 
rich in institutional detail, and accordingly very informative. 
They make this an essential reference work. However, Part II is 
not issue or problem oriented. While the very real change and 
growth that has occurred is documented it is done so rather 
dryly, without emphasizing the very real turbulence of the 
process. In general, the chapters focus on the banking system, 
particularly the city and regional banks ("ordinary banks"), with 
relatively little attention to the securities companies and 
capital markets. This is not surprising, given traditional 
central bank responsibilities for maintenance of the banking 
system and the operation of monetary policy through it. 
Chapter Three ("Financial Assets"), as its title indicates, 
provides a useful description of the characteristics of the 
various types of financial assets from the perspective of 
individual or corporate asset holders as of early 1986: the 
various kinds of deposits, trust accounts, government and 
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corporate bonds, corporate shares, mortgage securities, and 
insurance contracts. Where appropriate special tax treatment 
provisions are noted, such as the maruyu interest exemption, the 
securities transactions tax, withholding of income taxes on 
interest or capital gains and the special tax benefits for 
corporations of special purpose trust accounts (popularly called 
tokkin) and pension trusts. This chapter tells you as much as you 
ordinarily need to know about the characteristics of different 
types of financial assets. For example, this is the place to go 
if you want to know what a crensaki short-term instrument and 
transaction is, the three types of crensaki, who participates in 
the crensaki market, and so on. 
Of course, this discussion is not designed to provide the 
reader specific guidance as to what financial assets to hold. 
That depends on the particular mix of yield, safety, maturity, 
liquidity and other specific attributes desired by an asset 
holder. It also depends on the amount of funds available since, 
for example, all but quite large deposits (from the perspective 
of the average individual) continue to be subject to regulated 
interest rate ceilings. 
The chapter begins with a useful classification of financial 
assets according to function (for transactions or investment 
purposes), certainty of return ( safe versus risky), whether the 
interest rates on particular assets are regulated by the monetary 
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authorities or market determined, whether the financial asset can 
be sold (such as deposits versus bonds), and whether the asset is 
a liability of a financial institution (indirect finance) or 
shares or bonds issued by a non-financial business corporation 
(direct finance). The classification of specific financial 
assets and their characteristics is by no means static, 
especially since financial innovation has developed so many new 
financial instruments and new ones are being created all the 
time. The deregulation process has been gradually moving down 
from large denomination financial instruments ("wholesale 
markets") to smaller units ("retail markets" for ordinary 
individuals). The presentation includes a clear explanation of 
the narrow and broad definitions of money and measures of money 
supply. One nice touch: in what is a rather dry, straight-
forward presentation, the authors refer to and explain a number 
of popular phrases such "wide" coupon bank debentures, "jumbo" 
government bond investment trusts, "big" loan trusts, and "hit" 
money trusts (marketed as a big hit among potential customers). 
Chapter 4 ("Financial Markets and Interest Rates") is key to 
understanding Japan's financial system. The short-term money 
market, the foreign exchange market, and the securities market 
are described: their size, evolution, who the players are, how 
trading is carried out, collateral requirements, tax treatment. 
Not surprisingly, most attention is given to the money market, 
since the Bank of Japan participates actively in the interbank 
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call and bills markets to influence those short-term interest 
rates, which normally quickly spread to the free, cpmpetitive 
open market for gensaki, negotiable certificates of deposit 
(CD's) bankers acceptances (BA's), Euro-yen deposits, large unit 
time deposits and, since November 1987, commercial paper (CP). 
The explanation of the various mechanisms of interest rate 
determination is central to the story of Japan's liberalization 
(and non-liberalization) process. Interest rates are the price 
for holding or issuing financial assets. When interest rates are 
determined by the interaction of demand and supply in competitive 
markets they provide information as to how participants in the 
economy evaluate riskiness of different kinds of assets, the 
trade-off between the present and the future, expectations about 
future rates of inflation, and, in now internationally linked 
financial markets, expectations about exchange rate movements. 
Japan has three categories of interest rates: the official 
discount rate set by the Bank of Japan as the basic policy rate; 
rates regulated by law or agreement, notably those on bank and 
postal saving deposits, the short-term and long-term prime rate 
of banks, and the rate for government and other new bond issues; 
and the market-determined "free" rates for many short-term 
financial instruments (gensaki, BA's, CD's, Euro-yen deposits, 
large denomination time deposits, CP), and the yields on 
bonds (and stocks) already issued and being traded. The rate 
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setting arrangements for bank deposits and loans and separately 
for postal savings are clearly described. 
The co-existence of regulated and market-determined interest 
rates and yields on financial assets which are reasonable close 
substitutes for each other is inconsistent and ultimately 
untenable. Indeed, this is the most important force driving 
deregulation in Japan and elsewhere. Once holders of large 
amounts of short-term surplus cash could freely invest in qensaki 
instruments, then it was inevitable that banks would insist on 
the right to issue competitive, large denomination certificates 
of deposit and time deposits. The development of other types of 
financial assets and movement into less large denominations has 
been an ongoing process. 
There are, not surprisingly, other regulatory constraints 
which create artificial gaps between highly substitutable 
financial assets. These create opportunities for profitable 
arbitrage as loopholes are found. I gather, as a recent example, 
regional banks have been subject to guidance by the monetary 
authorities limiting their holdings of large-denomination city 
bank time deposits. Several top ranking trading and other 
companies can now freely issue commercial paper. One would 
expect their interest rates not to be lower than those on bank 
competitive time deposits since risk and maturity are comparable. 
That, in fact, such rates have been lower, suggests they are 
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engaging in arbitrage, selling their commercial paper to regional 
banks, buying city bank time deposits, and earning the spread. 
This sort of anomaly forces further deregulation and 
liberalization. 
But one should not infer that such pressures make complete 
liberalization inevitable in the foreseeable future. As the 
authors dryly point out, the lack of an effective Treasury Bill 
(TB) market impedes the ready use of open market operations as an 
instrument of monetary policy; but there seems to be little 
inclination by the Ministry of Finance to create a highly liquid, 
large-sized TB market. And the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications, which controls postal savings and postal life 
insurance rates, is likely to remain unresponsive to the desires 
of both the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. 
The detailed, straightforward description of Japan's types 
of financial institutions (Chapter 5) comprises almost one-third 
of the book. Figure 5.1 (pp. 166-67) provides an excellent 
overview, including the system of classification which serves as 
the basis for organizing the subsequent discussion of each 
category of financial institution. The first division is between 
private and governmental financial institutions; the former 
predominate in numbers and in funds involved. Private 
institutions are classified into three categories: banks, 
(depository institutions) broadly defined; other financial 
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intermediaries, for insurance, housing finance, consumer finance, 
securities finance, and venture capital; and other financial 
institutions, namely securities companies and the six interbank 
money market dealers. For each type of financial institution the 
discussion proceeds, in more or less detail, from overview to 
operations to their assets, liabilities, and income and 
expenditure. It is all necessary, if almost inevitably mundane 
and dry, material. 
Japan has many types of financial institutions that can 
accept current deposits and accordingly are technically 
classified as banks. These include: city banks, regional banks, 
foreign banks, long-term credit banks, trust banks, socro banks, 
and a large number of small credit institutions for small 
business, agriculture, forestry, fishing and labor organizations 
and their regional and national peak institutions. In practice, 
and certainly in the thinking of the Bank of Japan, the core of 
the banking system, and indeed perhaps the entire financial 
system, has long been the city and regional banks (termed 
"ordinary banks"). The treatment of their activities is the most 
detailed, including their now huge amounts of foreign currency 
loans and borrowings, their role in underwriting, selling and 
trading government bonds, and their underwriting of corporate 
securities in the Euro-currency markets. There is, however, no 
discussion of bank hidden reserves in the form of undervalued 
securities holdings, or of loan portfolio problems of poorly 
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performing loans to certain developing countries and certain 
domestic industries. 
This chapter briefly treats the various government financial 
institutions, and provides a nice if terse delineation of the 
Government's Fiscal Investment and Loan Program (FILP). In 
essence, the government pools postal savings and life insurance 
funds and national welfare and pension funds, and provides them 
(as loans, bond purchase, or capital subscription) to local 
governments, public corporate bodies, and government financial 
institutions. Almost two-thirds of the FILP funds are eventually 
relent to the private sector, mainly for housing and small 
business. Overall the share of total private business industrial 
funding is modest but non-trivial (5.8 percent overall but 19.2 
percent of plant and equipment financing in 1984). 
Postal savings in Japan are huge, having grown substantially 
more rapidly over the past twenty years than bank time deposits 
so that they now are about equal to the total deposit balances 
held by individuals in all banks (p. 290) . They are an immense 
source of relatively cheap funds for the government, to finance 
both the FILP program and its own bond issues. Much to the 
dismay of the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Japan, and the 
private financial institutions, the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications (MPT) has considerable control over setting 
postal saving interest rates and even over how the postal life 
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insurance funds are invested. The authors stress that the 
effectiveness of monetary policy is undermined when two separate 
authorities can set ceiling rates on time deposits, and quietly 
press for a unified system under the monetary authorities. The 
role of postal savings and the power of the MPT is fascinating, 
but that is another book. The recent elimination of tax 
exemption on interest earnings (maruyu) makes postal savings 
somewhat less attractive; and in the longer run postal savings, 
like small-scale bank time deposits, will have to compete with 
the attractive new financial products the Ministry of Finance 
reluctantly allows the securities companies, life insurance 
companies, trust banks and others to create. 
Several general themes emerge from the welter of 
institutional description in Chapter 5. First, the formal 
structure of Japan's financial system has been very stable, by 
category and even by number of financial institutions in major 
categories. While there have been some mergers, essentially 
there have been no new domestic entrants. The only new entrants 
have been foreign — banks, securities companies, and trust 
banks. Their market shares remain small. Second, over time 
major shifts in funding and power have taken place among 
institutions in different categories, muchless within each 
category. These include: the rise in postal savings; the 
increasing fund surplus of specialized agriculture and small 
business institutions; and especially the surge of securities 
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companies, notably the Big Four, to the forefront of financial 
transactions and profits. Third, with increasing freedom of 
activities, financial institutions are expanding beyond their 
traditional markets, invading each other's turf previously 
protected by the regulatory authorities. Market segmentation and 
traditional niches continually erode. 
The final chapter - on the nature and functions of the Bank 
of Japan as central bank - contains a nice, clear, general 
explanation of the objectives and implementation of monetary 
policy. As in other countries the fundamental objectives of 
monetary policy are domestic price stability, economic growth, 
equilibrium in the balance of payments and prevention of 
financial crisis ("maintenance of orderly credit conditions"). 
On occasion, the first three objectives are in conflict in Japan 
as elsewhere, and the terms of the trade-offs and the choices 
made indicate relative priorities of nations, as their historical 
episodes of monetary policy inform us. 
The Bank of Japan has the standard array of central bank 
policy tools: the official discount rate, loans to financial 
institutions, reserve requirements against bank deposits, and 
some limited capacity for open market operations though seriously 
constrained by the lack of a true Treasury Bill market. It also 
uses "window guidance" — quantitative limits on quarterly 
increases in loans for each financial institutions of any size to 
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reinforce periods of monetary tightness — though now mainly as a 
supplementary tool. 
A major issue for all central banks is whether to make their 
prime policy target interest rates or money supply. Since the 
mid-1970's the Bank of Japan has made broadly defined money (M2 
+CD's) its intermediate policy objective. It publishes quarterly 
"forecasts" which turn out, in practice, to be remarkable close 
to realized results. The Bank of Japan controls the money supply 
by influencing the short-term call and bill market interest rates 
(interbank market) through its own buying and selling operations 
and, allegedly, by moral suasion on the six intermediary dealers. 
Some foreigners have complained that, unlike the U.S. Federal 
Funds market which clears instantaneously by interest rate 
(price) movements, from time to time the interbank market dries 
up when the interest rate is not competitive. The view of the 
Bank of Japan as reflected in this text and other writings is 
that money supply targeting has been rather successful in 
implementing monetary policy (the right hand scale on Figure 6.1, 
page 317 is incorrect, I believe, in showing faster monetary 
growth than in fact occurred), though, ongoing financial 
innovation in Japan and in Euro-yen poses measurement and control 
difficulties. 
Japan's policy process of financial liberalization, still 
underway, has been very Japanese: quite controlled, slow 
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(especially in the perceptions of foreigners), but consistent in 
its liberalizing trend, and almost inexorable in the widespread 
acceptance of the inevitability of change - at some time in the 
near or less near future. It is a process primarily under the 
jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance, not the Bank of Japan. 
The Ministry of Finance has had to pursue a delicate political 
balancing act. Any specific piece of liberalization benefits 
some financial institutions, often by taking away previous 
privileges (rents in the economic jargon) from others; they in 
turn have to be compensated by some other beneficial 
liberalization. Because there are many conflicting vested 
interests at stake, the negotiations are complex and the process 
piecemeal. The political economy of the process of Japanese 
financial liberalization is a study yet to be published (but see 
Frances Rosenbluth, The Politics of Japan's Financial 
Deregulation. Cornell University Press, forthcoming). 
This book excellently achieves its objectives. It provides 
an authoritative, detailed, quite up-to-date description of 
Japan's financial system. As such, it is the definitive study, 
an essential reference work. It also provides a good, clear 
exposition and analysis of Japan's process of financial 
deregulation, liberalization, innovation, and 
internationalization over the past fifteen years. 
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At the same time, one has to be clear what the book does not 
do, and should not be expected to do. As essentially an official 
central bank document, it takes the high road in tone and 
content. Its style is straight forward and rather dry (in both 
Japanese and Western meanings). There is no place here for the 
rich dissection of specific cases of tumultuous conflict, of 
gossipy, insightful anecdotes, of the jockeying for power and 
benefit by different institutions and personalities. All that is 
properly the domain of private writers. 
The authors do not back away from several important 
controversial issues, notable the lack of a Treasury Bills 
market, the incompatibility of independence of postal savings for 
monetary policy, the need to complete the process of deregulation 
of interest rates so that, in part at least, the benefits accrue 
to small depositors as well as large. On the whole, nonetheless, 
they do not tackle in any substantial way a number of important 
issues for Japan's banking system. Given the nature of the book 
that is appropriate; but it does not mean such issues do not 
exist. With deregulation and greater competition, how can banks 
be prevented from excessive risk-taking? (How about problems of 
moral hazard since the Bank of Japan's safety net apparently is 
so strong?) What will be an appropriate system of prudential 
regulation to protect depositors and the system itself? Should 
commercial banks be allowed to engage in domestic underwriting 
and other activities heretofore reserved for securities 
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companies, and vice versa (should Article 65 be repealed)? 
Many of today's financial issues involve Japan's stock and 
bond markets, both new issues and trading: favored access to new 
issues, high fixed commissions, insider information. However, 
the capital markets and the securities companies receive only 
cursory treatment in this book. That is not surprising; after 
all they lie under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Finance 
not the Bank of Japan. 
Nor is this book intended to be a detailed history and 
analysis of Japan's recent monetary policy, and the strains to 
which it has been put in the efforts simultaneously to stimulate 
domestic demand-based real growth, prevent inflation, stabilize 
the exchange rate, and contain the exuberant rise in asset 
prices, notably Tokyo land and corporate shares listed on the 
stock exchanges. 
Nonetheless, as the definitive description in English on the 
Japanese financial system, the book does provide the structural 
skeleton and much substantive meat of institutional description. 
The data are readily updated from standard Bank of Japan sources. 
It certainly is the place to start, and for many purposes, 
provides as much information as may be needed, more detailed, 
technical analyses appear regularly in the Bank of Japan 
Institute's journal, Monetary and Economic Studies. Other useful 
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studies in English emanate from time to time from the research 
departments of several Japanese and foreign banks and securities 
companies (investment banks), as well as specialist financial 
newsletters. Useful descriptions of specific markets and 
institutions are available in the series of forty pamphlets being 
prepared under the aegis of the Foundation for Advanced 
Information and Research (FAIR, Japan) titled "FAIR Fact Series, 
Japan's Financial Markets." Aron Viner's Inside Japanese 
Financial Markets (Homewood, Illinois: Dow Jones - Irwin, 1988) 
is a readable and informative book, particularly on Japan's stock 
markets and securities companies. And the Japanese vernacular 
literature, especially newspapers and magazines, provide 
tremendous amounts of current information, insight, gossip, 
rumors. 
One final small point. For those used to the American 
numerical system, it should be noted that the British system is 
used throughout the test. That is, Y milliard equals Y 1,000 
million (U.S. billion), and Ybn. equals Y million million (U.S. 
trillion). In only a few instances is the American system used 
(e.g. Figure 5.2). In practice in almost all tables yen 
measurements are in units of 100 million. 
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